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Self-Location in Interactive Fiction
Paal Fjeldvig Antonsen 
The aim of this paper is to make sense of a characteristic feature of interactive fictions, such as video 
game fictions, adventure books and role playing games. In particular, I describe one important way 
consumers of interactive fiction ‘take on the role’ of a fictional character and are ‘ involved’ in the 
story. I argue that appreciative engagement with such works requires imagining being someone else 
and imagining parts of the story in a self-locating manner. In short, consuming works of interactive 
fiction involves imagining the story from the protagonist’s perspective.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to make sense of a familiar feature of self-involving interactive fic-
tions, such as narrative video games, adventure books and role playing games. Appreciative 
engagement with such works requires a level of participation over and above what we nor-
mally do when we read a novel, watch a movie or attend a theatre performance (Tavinor, 
2009; Gaut, 2010; Robson and Meskin, 2016 and 2017; Wildman and Woodward, 2018). 
The difference I have in mind is not a matter of emotional investment, vividness of experi-
ences or degree of enjoyment. Rather, it concerns the manner in which we engage with 
interactive fictions.
I find the following example instructive. As we read the (non-interactive) comic book 
Fables we are introduced to a fictional world where familiar fairy-tale characters live 
among us mundane people. In one particular scene, The Big Bad Wolf, also called ‘Bigby’, 
comes across The Woodsman, who is busy harassing a young woman (Sturgus and Justus, 
2015). The old rivals get into a brawl, ending with both crashing through the window and 
falling down several floors. The video game The Wolf Among Us (2013) takes place in the 
same fictional world. In fact, the same scene just described is portrayed in the game as 
well. What is different this time around, though, is that you play as the character Bigby. 
So not only do you need to contemplate the unfolding event, you also have to grasp that in 
this scenario you are to take on the role of Bigby and consider the situation from his point 
of view. The interactive version of the event involves you, the consumer, in some way.
In order to make sense of this common feature of interactive fiction, we need to ex-
plain what it means to say that the story ‘involves’ the consumer who ‘takes on the role’ 
of the protagonist. (I am aware that using the term ‘protagonist’ is misleading in some 
cases, but for simplicity’s sake I will be referring to the character that fulfills the avatar 
role in this way.) In what follows, I argue that these notions can be explained in terms 
of imagining interactive stories in a particular manner. My focus here is limited to the 
self-involving kinds of interactive fiction, although I will throughout the paper simply say 
‘interactive fiction’ for brevity’s sake. In the example above, we happen to imagine the 
same series of events in both cases. Whether we are reading the comic book or playing the 
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video game, we imagine Bigby and The Woodsman fighting and falling out the window. 
The way they come apart is that the same event is imagined in two different ways. When 
we read the comic book, we just imagine that Bigby and The Woodsman are fighting each 
other in some run-down apartment in New York. But as we play through the scene in The 
Wolf Among Us, we also imagine being the protagonist Bigby and contemplate the event 
from his first person point of view. Note that the notions I am trying to elucidate pertains 
to a self-involving interactive fiction with at least one protagonist. Although I am saying 
‘interactive fiction’ for short, I am not assuming that this holds for all instances of inter-
active fiction. In particular, if a fiction does not include one or more protagonists serving 
the avatar-role, they will not be covered by the account outlined here. Furthermore, I am 
also not suggesting that only interactive fiction will ask us to imagine being someone else. 
Other fiction addressing the reader in a second-person way might also be doing so.
The account outlined here shares its basic idea with the view presented by Robson 
and Meskin (2016 and 2017). In particular, they also claim that self-involving interactive 
fictions are ‘about those who consume them’ (2016, p. 165) and that doing so involves 
first-person imaginings (ibid., p. 169). They leave it open, however, in what sense the 
consumer is part of the fiction—and so about them—and how we should understand the 
content of the requisite imaginings. In this paper, I flesh out the basic idea and provide 
further motivations for why we should accept it. In particular, in Section 3 I propose that 
imaginings induced by interactive fictions are a special case of self-locating (also known as 
de se or indexical) attitudes—that is, thoughts about oneself when one thinks about one-
self in a first-person way. Section 4 argues that they way such thoughts are about oneself 
is not in the sense that they are about ones actual (or believed) self, but about the person 
one takes to be identical to oneself in the fictional worlds. I end with a description of how 
the contents of such imaginings can be described in terms of two-dimensional centred 
propositions.
2. The Imagination Assumption
The suggestion I outlined for what is characteristic of interactive fiction makes an assump-
tion about fiction in general: that appreciative engagement with works of fiction involves 
adopting counterfactual attitudes about individuals, situations and events. By ‘counter-
factual attitude’ I mean a thought one can entertain while taking its content to be false. 
Although desires, hopes and wishes are all examples of counterfactual attitudes, it is im-
aginings which are central for our discussion. Since this idea is an important background 
premise of my main claim, I will call it ‘The Imagination Assumption’.
As we read McCarthy’s The Road (2006), for example, we imagine a bleak, post-
apocalyptic world in which a man and his son struggle to overcome hardships and perils. 
I am not making the presumption that we are imagining everything that takes place within 
this fictional world, only that we mentally track the principal events holding the narra-
tive together. As said, I assume this imaginative process to be playing out whether we 
are engaged with a traditional fiction like The Road or an interactive fiction. So when we 
are playing Naughty Dog’s The Last of Us (2014) we also imagine a similarly bleak world, 
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I am using the term here, is a cognitive attitude with propositional content. Appreciative 
engagement with fiction certainly involves a lot of mental imagery as well, but that part 
of the process will not play a role in my argument. Likewise, engagement with fiction in-
volves conative attitudes, but in this paper I want to remain neutral on whether this calls 
for full-blooded desires, fears and the like, or whether they are best understood in terms 
of some other kind of mental states, such as aliefs (Gendler, 2008), i-desires (Doggett and 
Egan, 2012) and quasi-emotions (Walton, 1978).
Apart from its intuitive appeal, I  think there are two central motivations for The 
Imagination Assumption. The first comes from the fact that it is supported by another 
plausible claim, namely that storytelling, whether conceived of as a speech act or some 
cognate, involves a proposal to imagine the information conveyed (Currie, 1990; Walton, 
1990; García-Carpintero, 2007 and 2013; Stock, 2011). If the act of storytelling that φ 
comes with an invitation for the audience to imagine that φ, it is integral to the resulting 
work’s status as a piece of fiction that it facilitates acts of imagining.
Storytelling, on this account, works analogously to assertion. The crucial way in which 
they differ is the mental attitude in play: assertion involves a proposal to believe, while 
storytelling involves a proposal to imagine. If someone asserts that φ, and everything is 
going as it should, we normally understand them to be expressing their belief that φ and 
proposing that we start believing it as well. But when we recognize that someone is telling 
a fictional story—for example, by them saying something like ‘once upon a time’—we do 
not take them to be expressing a belief they hold nor suggesting that we actually believe 
what they have told us. If we fail to realize that McCarthy is not trying to prompt an up-
date of our beliefs concerning the events described in the novel, we are failing to treat it 
as a work of fiction. On the other hand, if we fail to imagine central parts of the story, we 
are not in a position to contemplate its content and appreciate it in an aesthetic manner. 
We can, of course, decline the invitation, but that would be tantamount to refusing to 
take part in the aesthetic experience it might facilitate. As long as the standard account of 
storytelling is on the right track, The Imagination Assumption follows.
Saying that storytelling involves an invitation to imagine does not entail that authors 
of fiction are not also trying to influence our beliefs and desires. On the contrary, I sus-
pect that doing just that is a motivating reason for many authors to produce fiction in 
the first place. For example, by giving such a flattering portrayal of a fictional Alexander 
the Great, Mary Renault was probably trying to make us also believe that the historical 
Alexander had all kinds of admirable attributes (Renault, 1969). Novelists like Dickens 
and Tolstoy, and video game directors like Ken Levine and David Cage, use their fictional 
works as vehicles for political and philosophical commentary. So although storytelling 
involves an invitation to imagine, on my view, that is not all creators of fiction are up to. 
Sometimes the whole point in getting us to imagine a fictional story is to prompt a change 
in our attitudes as a result of us contemplating that very possibility.
The second motivation for The Imagination Assumption starts with the observation that 
actions and emotions are regularly explained by reference to a combination of cognitive and 
conative attitudes. Suppose John give Kaidan a cake. The explanation might that he wanted 
to cheer Kaidan up, and believed that giving him a cake would do just that. Suppose Lisa is 
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run over by a car, when she so strongly desired to protect and play with Sir Pounce-a-lot 
again. A good explanation is often one that permits generalisations leading to reasonably 
accurate predictions in relevantly similar cases. Without assuming that the emotions we 
experience when consuming fiction and encountering the events in real life are exactly the 
same, they are at least very similar. And if we apply the standard model of explanation to 
emotions that come as a result of engaging with fiction, imagination is the most plausible 
cognitive component (see also Weinberg and Meskin, 2006; Doggett and Egan, 2012).
As an illustration, the aesthetic experiences afforded by The Road is intimately linked to 
what we feel about the situations described in the book. These feelings must partly come 
about as a result of us having the requisite desires (or desire-like states) for certain out-
comes—for example, that the young boy not be captured by lurking cannibals. Some kind 
of desire like that would have to play a part in the explanation for why we first feel dread as 
the cannibals approach, followed by relief when the boy manages to escape. Another part 
of the explanation will involve us also having some relevant cognitive attitude. Now we 
clearly do not believe that any of this is actually taking place, as we are under no illusion 
that McCarthy is giving an accurate portrayal of real events. In order for the appropriate 
emotions to kick in, then, we need to entertain the thoughts conveyed by the novel while 
not taking them to be true. In other words, we need to contemplate the fictional events 
under some kind of attitude that is both cognitive and counterfactual. The most readily 
available explanation for our feelings of dread and relief in this case is that we imagine 
the young boy being in danger, while desiring his safety. This does not exclude that there 
could be other ways of explaining such feelings, but the ease with which the standard 
model can be transported to cases involving fiction gives us some further motivation for 
accepting The Imagination Assumption.
3. The Indexicality Thesis
So far I have talked about what works of fiction have in common. In short, they invite us 
to imagine parts of their stories. From this point, the discussion will focus on what I think 
is distinctive about our imaginative engagement with interactive fiction. The suggestion 
I  presented in the introduction can be divided into two parts. The first, which I  will 
call ‘The Indexicality Thesis’, says that engagement with interactive fictions involves self-
locating imaginings.
Before I go on to motivate this idea, I should briefly say something about self-locating 
attitudes in general. The most prominent feature of such attitudes is that they could be 
expressed using some suitable sentence containing the first-person pronoun. My be-
lief that I live under a bridge is a self-locating belief, and my desire that I will get the 
last chocolate cupcake is a self-locating desire. The same goes for the other attitudes. 
In particular, my imagining that I am swimming with a herd of manatees and my im-
agining that I  am kissing Tom Cruise are both self-locating imaginings. What these 
examples have further in common is that they are thoughts I entertain about myself in 
a first person way.
The most familiar semantic theories designed to handle self-locating attitudes em-
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1979; Egan, 2006; Ninan, 2010). I will do the same for the purposes of this discussion. 
The Lewisian account is refinement of the idea that the content of agent’s attitude is 
a set of possible worlds, such that an agent x believes a proposition p in a world w just 
in case all the possible worlds compatible with what x believes in w are contained in p. 
In order to model self-locating attitudes, Lewis suggests, we should replace possible 
worlds with centred worlds. A centred world is usually construed as a triple consisting 
of a possible world, a time, and an individual who exists in that world and at that time. 
Since we will be setting the temporal aspect aside, we can treat a centred world as a 
possible world w centred on an agent x in w. On this account, then, a proposition is a 
set of centred worlds. For example, the propositional content of my imagining that 
I am kissing Tom Cruise is the set {⟨w, x⟩: x kisses Tom Cruise in w}. I happen to be im-
agining this particular proposition in a world w just in case every centred world ⟨w*,x*⟩ 
belonging to this set is compatible with that I imagine in w — that I am the x* kissing 
Tom Cruise in w*.
My proposal is that imaginings induced by interactive fiction is an overlooked instance 
where we find ourselves entertaining self-locating thoughts. The main reason I find this 
idea attractive is that it explains the elusive notion that interactive fictions are in some 
sense about the people who consume them, in Robson and Meskin’s (2016) terms. In the 
introduction I started with such an example: as you play through the brawling scene be-
tween Bigby and The Woodsman, the game invites you to ‘partake’ in the fighting with 
The Woodsman. The interactive nature of this engagement is accounted for if we say that 
rather than imagining the coarse-grained proposition that Bigby is fighting The Woodsman, 
you adopt a self-locating imagining whose content is the centred proposition {⟨w, x⟩: x is 
fighting The Woodsman in w}. You are thereby not simply imagining the event taking 
place, you are doing it from Bigby’s perspective. The sense in which you partake in the 
story is that you are imagining it in a first person way—as if it was all happening to you. 
This way of cashing out the ‘involvement’ component of interactive fiction draws the 
requisite distinction between how we engage with the comic book Fables and how we 
engage with the video game, even when the two fictions contain the same scene. When 
reading about the brawling scene in Fables, you are asked to imagine the proposition {⟨w, 
x⟩: Bigby fights The Woodsman w}. Here the agent coordinate x is idle and varying it 
makes no difference to how the event is contemplated. So although the comic book and 
the video game asks us to imagine the same set of possible worlds—the worlds where 
Bigby is fighting The Woodsman—they differ in the manner in which we do so. Only the 
videogame invites us to imagine a proposition that involves thinking about ourselves as an 
agent x inhabiting the worlds comprising the fictional events and consider it from x’s first 
person point of view.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that everything we are asked to imagine by an 
interactive fiction is self-locating. Similar to how most of the beliefs that I have about the 
actual world are not essentially about me, keeping track of an interactive fiction’s narra-
tive will involve adopting many attitudes that are not self-locating. For example, The Wolf 
Among Us also invites us to imagine that New York is a dangerous place, that there are 
talking pigs and flying monkeys, and that Tweedle Dum and Tweedle Dee are a pair of 
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of the story we imagine in a first person way are the ones that concern the protagonist. 
I am also talking loosely about ‘x inhabiting a world w’, because I want to abstract away 
from metaphysical issues when it comes to existence in non-actual possible worlds. The 
account presented here is meant to be independent of one’s particular metaphysical views.
The Indexicality Thesis can also be supported on linguistic grounds. The first is the 
observation that when consuming an interactive fiction we routinely report on the fic-
tional going-ons using the first person pronoun (see also Robson and Meskin, 2016). For 
example, if you are playing through the scene where Bigby is fighting The Woodsman you 
can report on this event by saying ‘I am fighting The Woodsman’. By itself this does not 
entail The Indexicality Thesis, but we do get there one some fairly standard assumptions. 
The first is The Imagination Assumption, that when we consume an interactive fiction we 
imagine the information that it conveys. So when the video game starts showing Bigby 
fighting The Woodsman, you imagine this event taking place. The second assumption, 
accepted by most accounts of fictional reports, is that when we report on fictional events 
we express propositions the fiction has invited us to imagine. Given this background, 
when you say ‘I am fighting The Woodsman’ you are expressing a proposition the fiction 
has invited you to imagine using a first person pronoun. In other words, a standard ex-
ample of a self-locating attitude. Note that I am here talking about fictional reports used 
in the first-person way. We do, of course, also make first-personal statements that do not 
pertain to the fictional story (Patridge, 2017). That is, we say things like ‘I pushed the X 
button’ and ‘I’ve replayed this section at least five time’. When making such comments, 
however, we are not talking about parts of the story conveyed, but the mechanical aspect 
of some video game. As such, they do not give us information about what’s taking place 
within the narrative the game is used to reveal. My argument says that it is our use of first-
personal fictional reports that gives us a reason to accept the Indexicality Thesis, because it 
is only such statements that are both expressing a self-locating attitude and reporting on 
the fictional story.
The second linguistic reason for accepting The Indexicality Thesis comes from observing 
the way we ascribe attitudes to people who are engaged with interactive fiction. To get the 
right set up, let us consider the non-interactive case first. Suppose you are watching your 
friend Betty reading Fables for the first time. She has just begun perusing the page where 
Bigby crashes into The Woodsman and the situation escalates into a brawl. Betty, you 
know, is well aware that Bigby is the physically more powerful one, and you can report 
on this by saying ‘Betty expects Bigby to win the fight’. Moving over to the interactive 
case, things are slightly different. Suppose you are watching Betty playing through the 
same scene in The Wolf Among Us. You could, of course, make the same statement—that 
‘Betty expects Bigby to win the fight’—although that might be considered somewhat un-
usual. The noteworthy point is that you could also report on her attitude by simply saying 
‘Betty expects to win the fight’. In order to evaluate this sentence we usually ascribe to 
it a syntactic form along the lines of ‘Betty expects PRO to win the fight’, where PRO 
is a phonologically null pronoun whose job it is to pick out the individual that Betty ex-
pects to win. For the purposes of this paper, it does not really matter what precisely the 
correct semantics is for this sentence. As far as The Indexicality Thesis is concerned, it is 
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a self-locating thought (for example, Chierchia, 1989; Schlenker, 2003). To get the right 
truth condition we must quantify over the centred worlds compatible with what Betty 
expects, treating the complement clause ‘PRO to win the fight’ as expressing the self-
locating proposition {⟨w*,x*⟩: x* wins the fight in w*}. In short, ‘Betty expects PRO to 
win the fight’ is true only if Betty expects the proposition {⟨w*, x*⟩: x* wins the fight in 
w*} in w, which she does only if it is compatible with what she expects in w that she is x* in 
w* and x* wins the fight in w*. So Betty’s expectation that PRO wins the fight is a thought 
she entertains in a first person way, which she could have expressed using a first person 
pronoun (‘I expect that I will win the fight’). The fact that we talk about people engaged 
with interactive fiction as if they are entertaining self-locating attitudes gives us another 
reason for believing that they actually do.
4. The Identity Thesis
My argument so far has tried to motivate the idea that some events that take place in inter-
active stories—events involving the protagonist—are imagined in a self-locating manner. 
In this section, I move on to the second part of my suggestion, which I will refer to as 
‘The Identity Thesis’. It says that interactive fictions petition us to make one further im-
aginative leap: by taking on the role of the protagonist we imagine being that character.
In the previous section, I introduced The Indexicality Thesis to explain how we as con-
sumers can be said to take part in an interactive story. What The Identity Thesis is meant 
to account for is that when we consume interactive fiction we play as characters distinct 
from our actual selves. Note that I am not saying that we cannot entertain such imaginings 
when consuming traditional works of fiction as well. Nothing prevents you from pro-
jecting yourself into the role of Lady Dedlock as she realizes that the sinister Tulkinghorn 
has discovered the secrets of her shameful past. The point I am making is just that you 
do not have to do so in order to appreciate Dicken’s Bleak House (1852-1853) in the ap-
propriate way. It might be that to achieve the prescribed cognitive-affective response you 
must empathise more with Dedlock than Tulkinghorn, but that is not the same as having 
to imagine being either of them. In contrast, when engaging with an interactive fiction 
first hand, you really do need to play as one of the characters (the qualifier ‘first hand’ is 
meant to rule out instances where you watch other people play).
Imagining being someone else is not unique to fiction. It is just that some works of 
fiction accomplish their aesthetic goals by taking advantage of this familiar imaginative 
process. To get some independent grasp of what this involves, consider the following 
scenario from Lewis:
Here am I, there goes poor Fred; there but for the grace of God go I; how lucky 
I am to be me, not him. Where there is luck there must be contingency. I am con-
templating the possibility of my being poor Fred, and rejoicing that it is unrealized. 
I  am not contemplating a possibility that involves any qualitative difference in the 
world—not, for instance, a world where someone with origins just like mine suffers 
misfortunes just like Fred’s. Rather, I am contemplating the possibility of being poor 
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Here’s a way to describe what is going on: Lewis indulges in an act of self-projection. He 
first contemplates the possibility of being Fred while suffering misfortune, and then men-
tally retreats back to his actual self to rejoice that this possibility is not realized. Lewis 
is not contemplating that he, David Lewis, could have suffered the misfortunes of poor 
Fred. Rather, he imagines himself being Fred, who happens to be the owner of the mis-
fortune. Although the episode does not involve Lewis imagining his actual self under dif-
ferent circumstances, he is still himself involved in the imagined possibility.
What kind of ‘possibility’ does Lewis have in mind when he is contemplating being 
poor Fred? He is not talking about a different, yet possible world, since Lewis makes it 
clear that he is considering ‘a world just like this one’. The only difference is that he has 
adopted the identity of poor Fred, leaving every other aspect of the world unchanged. 
I think we can make sense of Lewis’ state of mind using the same strategy we employed 
to distinguish between the interactive and non-interactive version of the same fictional 
event. That is, when Lewis is imagining being poor Fred, he imagines the centred prop-
osition {⟨w, x⟩: x is Poor Fred in w}, where every w is compatible with what he actually 
believes. So although Lewis imaginatively conceives of the world in a different way—one 
where his personal identity is located in poor Fred—he does not imagine the actual world 
being any different otherwise from what he believes it to be.
Recognising that it is possible for us to imagine being someone else does not establish 
The Identity Thesis. I still have to argue that when we engage with interactive fictions we 
actually do imagine being the protagonist in a similar way to how Lewis imagined being 
poor Fred. To shift the example, suppose Betty is playing as the space hero John Shepard 
in the video game Mass Effect (2007), travelling across the galaxy on numerous adventures. 
Given The Imagination Assumption, this means that the game petitions her to follow the 
instruction ‘imagine that you are John Shepard’. The problem for my view is that there 
are at least three ways in which she could comply:
 (1) Imagining that it turned out that she is Shepard. 
 (2) Imagining herself having the properties ascribed to Shepard. 
 (3) Imagining being Shepard. 
These are all possible ways for Betty to ‘take on the role’ of Shepard in some sense. 
In the case of (1), Betty would have to imagine that her actual life story was somehow 
intertwined with Shepard’s fictional one. She could, for example, imagine that she went 
through cosmetic surgery and entered the space soldier program. Although I  am not 
denying that Betty could do so if she wanted to, it is fairly obvious that this is not what 
playing Mass Effect usually entails. The real candidates, then, are (2) and (3). The com-
petitor to my view, (2), is the kind of imagining we engage in when we entertain coun-
terfactual thoughts such as what we would have done had we been richer, stronger, of a 
different background, lost our legs or magically transformed into a dragon. We contem-
plate a change in our actual properties, but preserve those that remain unaffected by the 
alterations. If Mass Effect only requires Betty to do (2), she need only contemplate being 
herself in counterfactual circumstances.
It is difficult to pry apart situations where you imagine being someone else and situ-
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to fit with The Imagination Assumption and The Indexicality Thesis. As Shepard flies to 
Mars, for example, both allow us to say that Betty imagines the centred proposition {⟨w, 
x⟩: x flies to Mars in w}. The question is whether Betty takes x to be her actual self—that 
is (2)—or whether she takes x to be Shepard, whom she also imagines to be identical to 
herself in w—that is (3). I’ll spend the rest of this paper laying out two reasons for why 
I think we should believe that playing Mass Effect involves (3) rather than (2).
The first reason has to do with fictional importation. What is true in a fiction goes far 
beyond what we are explicitly told. We routinely flesh out a fictional world by drawing 
on information gathered from common knowledge, presuppositions and implicatures 
(Currie, 1990; Walton, 1990; Gendler, 2000). Mass Effect never tells us that Vancouver 
is north of New York, for example, but it is true in the fiction nonetheless. Likewise, 
many facts about the characters are never made explicit and we can only infer them using 
background information. The way we import information into a fictional world seems 
to satisfy what Friend (2017, pp. 32–34) calls ‘The Reality Assumption’: if φ is true in 
the actual world, then φ is also fictionally true, unless excluded by the work. The thing 
to note about The Reality Assumption is that it makes it much more likely that Betty is 
doing (3) rather than (2). If she were to imagine the story by way of (2), she would import 
facts about her actual self unless it was excluded by Mass Effect. This is, of course, what 
we usually do when we imagine ourselves in counterfactual circumstances, as (2) says is 
how we engage with fiction. But this does not square well with how we think of fictional 
characters in interactive fiction. Just because Betty loves strawberries, and Mass Effect is 
silent on the matter when it comes to Shepard, we do not consider it a part of the story 
that Shepard has a fondness for strawberries as well. Our reluctance to import facts about 
ourselves and our biographies is, however, exactly what you would expect if we are really 
imagining being someone else.
To give another example, consider how a protagonist’s preferences are determined. 
When engaged with an interactive fiction we typically have to make choices that im-
pact the story one way or another. In Mass Effect, Shepard has to decide on matters such 
as whether he should sacrifice civilians to achieve other goals, seek retribution for past 
injustices or whether he should go on a romantic date with his friend Liara. The fiction 
does not exclude the possibility that Shepard has more or less the same preferences as 
Betty has in the actual world. So if Betty were simply imagining herself in Shepard’s cir-
cumstances—adjusting for what the fiction says about him—she would import her own 
psychology and attribute it to Shepard. But doing so goes against how most interactive 
fictions play out. It is up to Betty to decide what character she wants Shepard to be, and 
she might play Shepard as having preferences altogether different from herself. It is, for 
example, perfectly possible for Betty to desire going on a date with Liara as Shepard in the 
fiction, while at the same be of the opinion that were she in Shepard’s circumstances she 
would not want to do so. Again, this is what we would expect if she is really doing (3) 
rather than (2). The fact that we do not usually import much information about our ac-
tual selves into the fiction supports the idea that we imagine being the protagonist. Since 
Shepard is a non-actual individual, there are no particular facts about him to import from 
the actual world. And that explains why his preferences are, as far as the fiction is con-
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The second reason for why we should accept The Identity Thesis makes use of a 
so-called ‘Lakoff case’ (Lakoff, 1972). To set it up properly we need to change the ex-
ample again. Suppose this time that Tom Cruise is playing a dating simulator game called 
Lovely Angels. In this game, Tom also plays as Shepard, the space soldier who always ends 
up dating famous people in Los Angeles. One night he is off on a blind date. While seated 
at the restaurant his partner for the evening arrives: it’s Tom Cruise! At this point in the 
game, (actual) Tom Cruise must imagine something he could have reported on by saying ‘I 
am dating myself’. In order to imagine this event, Tom Cruise must be able to distinguish 
between his fictional self and his actual self. But if he is doing (2), he cannot really differ-
entiate between them in terms of denying their identity in the fictional world. Because 
according to (2), his fictional self just is his actual self in counterfactual circumstances.
On the other hand, if what Tom Cruise is doing is (3), it is not at all mysterious how it 
is possible for Tom Cruise to engage in this kind of imagining. He just needs to keep track 
of which individual he takes himself to be in the different worlds. As he is playing through 
the scene, Tom Cruise is imagining in the actual world w that in the fictional world w* 
he is x*, who is identical to Shepard in w*, and that in w*, he is dating x, who is identical 
to Tom Cruise in w, but not in w*. In short, he is contemplating the possibility that his 
fictional self is dating his actual self. This fine-grained differentiation is only possible if 
Tom Cruise does not consider the person he is in the actual world to be identical, in the 
counterfactual world w*, with the person he is in w*. That means that Tom Cruise cannot 
be taking on the role of Shepard by simply contemplating his actual self in counterfactual 
possibilities. Rather, he must imagine being Shepard, a fictional character altogether dis-
tinct from the person he actually is.
In addition to supporting The Identity Thesis, the last example shows that contents of 
interactive imaginings are slightly more complex than mere centred propositions. When 
you consume an interactive story you do imagine your fictional self in a first person way, 
but you also have access to your actual (or believed) self. This is further witnessed by how 
easily we transition from talking about fictional self (‘I fought the Woodsman’) to talking 
about our actual selves (‘I’ve lost this fight several times’). In the example above, Tom 
Cruise just happened to do so in a single imaginative episode. When he imagines being 
the protagonist on a date, he imagines the event from the protagonist’s first person point 
of view, which includes his actual self viewed in a third-person way—or ‘from the out-
side’. But notice that if Tom Cruise’s thought I am dating myself was a centred proposition, 
it would be set of centred worlds {⟨w, x⟩: x is dating x in w}. According to this thought, 
x simply dates x in w. In other words, it would have to be the same individual in those 
worlds, making centred propositions unsuited for distinguishing between Tom Cruise’s 
actual self and his fictional self, as The Identity Thesis requires.
The most straightforward refinement we can make is to retain our established centred 
worlds approach, but describe interactive imaginings as having self-locating two dimen-
sional contents (Ninan, 2016). A  two-dimensional proposition has two centres, one 
centred on one’s actual self and one centred on one’s fictional self. By entertaining a 
proposition of this kind, Tom Cruise is able to keep track of his two distinct identities. 
Given the actual world, we first have the set of centred worlds compatible with what Tom 
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established relative to the first, and consists of the set of centred worlds that Tom Cruise 
imagines (in particular, that he is Shepard in those worlds). So the content of Tom Cruise’s 
imagining is the set of pairs of centred worlds {⟨w, x⟩, ⟨w*, x*⟩: x* is dating in x in w*}, 
such that x is Tom Cruise and x* is Shepard. When entertaining this dual self-locating 
thought, Tom Cruise is able to locate his actual self in the belief worlds and his fictional 
self in the fictional worlds. When his actual self is imported into the fictional worlds he no 
longer imagines his actual self in a first person. That role is played by Shepard.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have suggested a way to explain what makes interactive fiction special. We 
started off with the observation that when we engage with interactive fiction we take on 
the role of one of the characters and that we are, in some way, involved in the narrative. 
To clarify the notions of ‘taking on the role’ and ‘involved in the narrative’, I suggested 
we should combine three ideas: The Imagination Assumption, The Indexicality Thesis and 
The Identity Thesis. Together they constitute the paper’s basic idea that a characteristic 
feature of interactive fiction is that appreciative engagement with such works involves im-
agining being the protagonist and contemplating the story in a first person way.
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